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NOTES

mand an extension of the Levy rationale to successions, and this
writer hopes that the Supreme Court will recognize that such an
extension would be very undesirable.
Herschel E. Richard, Jr.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION -

TAXPAYER'S STANDING

To SUE

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds to finance certain
instruction in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and
other instructional materials for use in these schools. Such expenditures, authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,1 were alleged to be in contravention of the
Establishment And Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.2 Plaintiffs rested their standing to challenge the statute
on the fact that each pays income taxes to the United States.
Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing to sue was
sustained by a three-j udge district court for the Western District
of New York, one judge dissenting. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed, one justice dissenting.
Federal taxpayers have standing to challenge an exercise of the
congressional spending power alleged to be in violation of the
establishment clause of the Constitution. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.
Ct. 1942 (1968).
It is a basic maxim of federal jurisdiction that "the constitutionality of an act of government can only be decided when
raised as a justiciable issue."'3 Since "standing" is an aspect of
justiciability, 4 a litigant may attack an act of Congress as unconstitutional only if he has standing to make the challenge.5
Although the origins of this concept are unclear, it has been
suggested that it is a policy of judicial self-limitation that can
be traced back to a general reluctance of courts to interfere in
the affairs of the king.0 It has also been suggested that standing

OF

1. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. 821 (Supp. II, 1967).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 649, 650 (1936). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (1963).
4. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (1968).
5. E.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Lewis, Constitutional

Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962).
6. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HAv.L. REv. 338 (1923). Here
the author argues that standing is part of a general tendency of courts of noninterference with what they consider "political" questions. He traces this back
to the Talmud. This view was challenged in Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV.

L. REv. 296 (1925).
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is intimately related to the doctrines of judicial review' and
the separation of powers.8
The English first entertained a taxpayer's suit in 1829, 9
but it was not until 1847 that the first successful state taxpayer's
action 0 in America was decided. Since then at least thirtyfour states and most municipal jurisdictions" have allowed
such suits. Only two states 12 specifically deny standing to state
taxpayers. In recent years, therefore, there has been a trend
to recognize a state taxpayer's standing in such suits. In fact,
several states which formerly denied standing have reversed
themselves.1 3 Generally, the United States Supreme Court has
entertained suits by state taxpayers attacking state expenditures. 4 However, in 1952,1 the Court announced the important
qualification that taxpayer's actions can meet the constitutional
requirement of "case or controversy" only when it is a "goodfaith pocketbook action."e
The issue of federal taxpayer's standing was squarely faced
for the first time1 7 by the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Forthingham v. Mellon.Is Mrs. Frothingham, alleging that she
was a taxpayer of the United States, attacked the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 192119 on the ground that it invaded
an area reserved to the states by the Constitution. The act established a program in which federal grants were given to states
that would undertake programs to reduce maternal and infant
mortality. She complained that the effect of the act would be
to increase her taxes and "thereby take her property without
7. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward:The Passive Virtues, 75
; Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REV.
639 (1926). But see Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing,"

HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961)

14 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962).

8. C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF' T1lE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §

12 (1963).

9. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).

10. Adriance v. Mayor of New York, 1 Barb. 19 (N.Y. 1847).
11. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).

12. Id. at 901. These two states are New York and New Mexico.
13. Id. at 902. Louisiana falls into this group, having allowed taxpayer actions since 1929. Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123
So. 655 (1929).
14. E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
16. Id. at 434.
17. In three early cases, the Supreme Court entertained taxpayer suits
challenging federal expenditures without ruling on the standing issue. Two of
the cases, however, contained specific statements that the Court was not ruling
that taxpayers had standing to challenge federal spending. Wilson v. Shaw, 204
U.S. 24 (1907) ; Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) ; Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
18. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (also cited as Massachusetts v. Mellon).
19. Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
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due process of law. '2 0 The Court refused to review the merits
of the case, holding that Mrs. Frothingham lacked standing to
sue. While recognizing that it had entertained municipal taxpayer's suits, the Court stated that the position of a federal taxpayer is far different in that the latter's interest in the federal
treasury is shared by millions of others and therefore is "comparatively minute and indeterminable. ' 2 1 It was also noted that
to allow such a suit would enable any federal taxpayer to
challenge any federal expenditure-a prospect the Court seemed
to fear.2 2 Furthermore it was stated that the separation of
powers doctrine of the Constitution limited the power of the
Courts to review acts of Congress only when presented as a
"justiciable issue." This requires that the defendant show he
will sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the statute and "not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally. 2 3 The Mellon Court felt
a situathat to declare a federal statute unconstitutional in such
24
tion would be to assert an authority it did not possess.
The question of whether Frothingham established a constitutional bar to taxpayer suits or whether it announced a rule of
judicial self-limitation has been the subject of much debate.2 5
The Court in the instant case has seemingly accepted the prevailing view that the decision was based on non-constitutional
grounds.20 Conceding that the opinion in Frothingham could be
read to support either position, the majority asserted that standing focuses on the party who comes before a federal court and
not on the issues. "In other words, when standing is placed in
20. Frothingliam v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
21. Id. at 487. This argument has drawn much criticism from commentators.
It is pointed out that General Motors Corporation may pay billions of dollars
of taxes to the United States and virtually none to municipalities, yet it could
bring a taxpayer's suit only against a municipality.
22. The validity of this argument is questionable. The experience of states
and municipalities with taxpayer suits has shown that the judiciary can adequately
handle such cases. Cf. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
23. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
24. This decision has been defended in Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1937)
and Comment, 69 YALE L.. 895 (1960). Generally, however, present authorities
have criticized both its reasoning and result. E.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 22.09 (1958); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIlE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §13
(1963) ; Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1265 (1961) ; Note, 37 HARV. L. REV. 750 (1929).
25. The best collection of arguments for both positions is contained in
Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
26. In hearings conducted on a bill to legislatively provide standing for taxpayers to challenge federal grants to non-secular schools, the committee concluded: "Testimony at the hearings and the statements submitted to the subcommittee point out that the Frothingham decision was based on grounds other
than purely constitutional ones." S. REP. No. 85, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
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issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing
is challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a par' 27
ticular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.
Since the emphasis is on the party involved, the Court reasoned
that standing is a constitutional limitation only in that the plaintiff must have sufficient personal interest to insure a proper
adversary proceeding. Article III of the Constitution does not
prohibit taxpayer suits; it merely requires that such suits be
brought in a form capable of judicial determination.
The Court also said that it is still necessary to consider the
substantive issue.2 Only by so doing can it be determined
whether the party's relationship to the issue is such that a logical
nexus exists between the status asserted and the claim sought
to be adjudicated. Thus a federal taxpayer will be deemed to have
standing if he can meet two requirements. First, he must allege
that the statute attacked is an exercise of the congressional taxing and spending powers. 29 This will establish a necessary link
between the status of taxpayer and the type of enactment attacked. Secondly, he must assert that a specific constitutional
limitation was infringed. 3° The Court, therefore, indicated that
it is relationship between the party and issue which determines
standing rather than the issue itself. Since the taxpayers in
Flast challenged a federal spending program as a violation of
the establishment clause of the first amendment, the relationship
was such that the test for standing was clearly met. Frothingham
was distinguished on the ground that there the plaintiff failed
to allege that a specific constitutional limitation was breached.31
The Court refused to say whether the Constitution contains any
other specific limitations on the spending power, but clearly
indicated that if additional limitations are found, a federal taxpayer will have standing to challenge federal taxing or spending
that exceeds those limits. Then, and only then, can the Court be
certain that the issues will be contested in an adversary manner
consistent with Article III of the Constitution. The effect of
this is to limit taxpayers' actions to contesting only those expenditures which are specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
Although the United States system of government is traditionally thought of as one of delegated powers, the Court seems
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 (1968).
Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1954.
Id.
Id. at 1955.
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to say that regarding the spending and taxing power, only
those things specifically denied may be contested.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Flast indicate
the diverse thought on the subject. Two members3 2 of the Court
would allow standing to a taxpayer to challenge expenditure of
federal funds only on the ground that it violates the establishment clause. They reasoned that the founders placed it there
as an explicit prohibition on spending and taxing in aid of
religion and it, therefore, deserves special protection. Justice
Douglas,3 3 on the other hand, felt that the Court should have
gone further and overruled Frothingham completely. He reasoned that this would enable the courts to better fulfill their
role of protecting the individual against any prohibited conduct
by the federal government. In his dissenting opinion Justice
Harlan indicated that although he did not fully agree with the
reasoning and premises of Frothingham,he felt the result was
correct 4 for different reasons. He thus argued that the plain3
tiffs in Flast should have been denied standing. 5
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Flast that the doctrine
of standing announced in Frothinghamwas based on non-constitutional grounds appears to be sound. This is supported by
several cases 36 in which the Court upheld the right of Congress
to grant standing to "aggrieved persons" seeking review of administrative orders. If standing were a constitutional requirement, there is little doubt that it could not be granted by an act
of Congress. It should be noted that a bill to allow taxpayers
standing to challenge federal aid to non-public schools had passed
the Senate,3" and was being studied by a committee of the House
of Representatives 38 when the instant case was decided. The effect of this on the Court cannot, of course, be measured, but
32. Justices Stewart and Fortas. Id. at 1960.
33. Id. at 1956.
34. Justice Harlan seems to feel that unrestricted public actions might allow
too much authority in the courts. Cf. Statement by Dean Griswold of Harvard,
Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 496-97 (1966).
35. Justice Harlan contended that "the United States holds its general funds,
not as a stakeholder or trustee for those who have paid its imposts, but as a
surrogate for the population at large. Any rights of a taxpayer with respect to the
purposes for which those funds are expended are thus subsumed in, and extinguished by, the common rights of all citizens." Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942,
1962 (1968).
36. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) ; Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694 (2d Cir. 1943).
37. S. 3, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
38. 114 CoNG. REC. D349 (daily ed. March 24, 1968).
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one may assume that it did not wish to clash with the legislative
branch of the federal government.
It is submitted that a desirable result was reached in the
Flast case, but the reasoning of the majority appears to be
defective in that it is circular. The test formulated is that a
litigant will have standing when he has sufficient interest to
insure an adversary proceeding. "This does not, of course, resolve
the standing problem; it merely restates it. '39 Furthermore, the
goal desired by the Supreme Court is that each suit that reaches
the Court will be adequately contested, but the criteria that a
litigant must establish a logical nexus between his status and
his claim does not insure such a dispute. When the practical
effect of the Court's test is considered, it is difficult to see
how the plaintiff's interest in his suit is either diminished or
intensified by relying on a specific limitation on the spending
power rather than an allegation that Congress has generally
exceeded its authority. In commenting on taxpayers' suits, Professor Jaffe stated:
"There is little risk that the Court will not be adequately
briefed. A citizen or taxpayer sufficiently concerned to bring
a lawsuit in which he does not have a monetary concern is
for that reason likely to take seriously the presentation of
'' 0
the lawsuit. 1
The ultimate justification for allowing a taxpayer standing
is that it will allow adjudication on an important constitutional
41
issue. Although the present suit may cause some inconvenience,
a different decision would have allowed a program of doubtful
constitutional validity to continue uncontested-an intolerable
situation in a nation which considers its Bill of Rights guarantees
to be almost sacred. It has been suggested 41 that the Supreme
Court should move cautiously in liberalizing standing requirements. This is certainly sound advice, yet the experience of
municipalities and states4 3 illustrates that taxpayers' suits may
39. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1963 (1968) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Harlan).
40. Statement of Professor Jaffe, Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subeomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 449 (1966).
41. See the testimony of Mr. Ellenbogen, Assistant Counsel for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in which the difficulties of administering
a program of federal grants subject to suit were discussed. Hearings on S. 2097
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
42. Comment, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 141 (1960).
43. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960). See also Note, 50 HAuv. L. REV.
1276 (1937).
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quite adequately be handled by the judiciary. It is submitted that
a further erosion of the taxpayer standing rule would allow the
Court greater freedom in protecting the individual's fundamental
constitutional rights without abrogating other traditional judicial
limitations.
Winston R. Day

LEASE OF A MOVABLE: HOW THE PUBLIC POLICY OF LOUISIANA
AFFECTS THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION
OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES

Plaintiff, a tree-cutter, rented an aluminum extension ladder
from the American Rent All Company of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He signed a printed lease contract containing an exculpatory clause.1 Plaintiff, while working, climbed to the top
of the extended section of the ladder; it telescoped, causing him
to fall and sustain severe injuries. Held, the exculpatory clause
in the rental agreement between plaintiff and American Rent
All Company completely relieved the lessor and its insurer from
all liability. Such a stipulation is not contrary to the public
policy of Louisiana. The court did not consider whether the
ladder was defective or whether the plaintiff was negligent in
using the ladder.2 Celestin v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 387
F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968).
The Civil Code of Louisiana contains an entire section devoted
to the obligations and rights of the lessor. These obligations of
the lessor are made part of every contract of lease by operation
of law. 3 However, these expressed statutory obligations of the
1. Celestin v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968):
"The lessor makes no warranty of any kind on said equipment and the lessee agrees
to immediately return any leased equipment which develops indication of defect
or improper working condition: that the lessee agrees to use said equipment
entirely at his own risk, to be liable for any damage to persons or property resulting directly or indirectly from the use thereof and the lessee further agrees
to protect and save harmless the lessor, its agents, servants and employees from any
and all liability resulting from the operation or use of the above rented equipment . . . "

2. Id. at 539-40. Under the instructions given the jury in the trial court, the
general verdict rendered for the defendant did not disclose whether the jury found
(1) that the exculpatory clause completely absolved the defendant, (2) that the
ladder was defective, or (3) that the plantiff used it negligently.
3. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2692-2699. Article 2695 states: "The lessor guarantees
the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being
used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices
and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since,
provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee ; and if any loss should result
to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify
him for the same."

